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Introduction
　　　In 1989, Japan became the largest foreign 
aid donor in the world, and for the past fifty 
years, Japanese Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) has played a prominent role in Japan’s 
foreign policy, and Japan has applied a unique 
economic development approach compared 
to other advanced industrial nations. Also, the 
Japanese ODA policy shares with its colonial 
policy a similar economic development approach 
in Asia even though the domestic political system 
and the external environment have experienced 
significant changes since World War II.
　　　This study addresses the following 
questions: ( 1) why did Japan conduct its own 
independent economic development policies in 
Asia, although Japan’s other foreign policies 
were greatly influenced by the external 
environment, especially, the United States?; 
( 2) why did Japan’s colonial policy and its 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy 
toward Asia share similar unique economic 
deve lopment  approaches ,  even though 
historical contexts and purpose changed? This 
study examines theoretical explanations for 
continuity in foreign economic policy outcomes 
despite significant changes in international and 
domestic politics. 
　　　This research uses the role of institutions 
and ideas decision-makers held to analyze 
Japan’s colonial and foreign aid policies, since 
the idea of Japan’s economic development 
approach caused the similarities in those 
economic policies in the prewar and postwar 
periods. The idea was carried out through the 
continuity of personnel and institutionalized 
ideas in Japan’s ODA policy because “international 
and domestic constraints and opportunities, 
however, do not exist outside of individual 
cognition; rather they are perceived by policy 
makers based on their conceptual framework” 
(Sikkink, 1991: 19). In addition, Japanese political 
and economic organizations enforced the 
continuity of the ideas through organizational 
routines and a stable bureaucratic political 
system in the postwar period. 
　　　Through this research, six different ideas 
of Japan’s economic policy were identified: ( 1) 
promoting a self-help effort system; ( 2) seeking 
mutual interests between Japan and Asian 
countries; ( 3) a state-led economy and long-term 
development plan; ( 4) efficient public-private 
cooperation; ( 5) utilizing foreign capital and 
technology; and (6) an aim to establish an Asian 
economic bloc.  The continuity of these ideas 
can be seen even though historical contexts and 
purposes have changed. Continuity in the ideas 
of Japan’s economic development approach 
was examined by two historical case studies to 
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provide empirical evidence: ( 1) Japan’s colonial 
development policy for Manchuria between 1932 
and 1945; and (2) Japan’s ODA policies (focusing 
on 1965- 90) for Indonesia. Personnel continuity 
explains intellectual continuity in these case 
studies.   
Research Questions
　　　Japan’s colonial policies in Taiwan, 
Korea, and Manchuria were enhanced by 
Japan’s imperial motivations. Yet these polices 
included unique economic development policies 
comparing other Western imperialisms, and 
the policies share major similarities although 
Japan had different purposes in each colony 
depending on the stages and time of Japan’s 
imperialism.  After World War II, Japan started 
to provide its foreign aid to Asian countries like 
other Western industrialized nations. Why did 
Japan conduct its own independent economic 
development policies even though Japan’s other 
foreign policies were greatly influenced by the 
Cold War, especially, the United States? 
　　　Moreover, why do Japan’s colonial and 
ODA policy share similar unique economic 
development policies even though historical 
contexts and purposes changed? The Japanese 
domestic political system was restructured 
while the international system changed its 
configurations from a multipolar to a bipolar 
system. Yet Japanese economic policies in 
Asian countries did not change, and became 
recognized as the Asian Economic Development 
Style (The World Bank, 1988).  
　　　Structural Realism cannot explain the 
continuity in Japan’s economic foreign policy 
despite radical changes in the external security 
environment. The bureaucratic politics approach 
can account for continuity in the postwar era 
since the same bureaucratic political decision-
making process was conducted for Japanese 
ODA policy. This approach, however, does not 
provide reasons why diverging interests among 
different ministries and agencies could be 
accommodated to continue the same economic 
development policy over the last hundred 
years. Also, ODA literature does not explain the 
origin of Japan’s economic development policies 
completely because it does not examine Japan’s 
foreign economic policies before World War II.1
　　　Japan’s economic development policies 
are the dependent variables for this study. 
Specifically, major similarities in the economic 
development policies of Japan’s colonial and 
ODA policy will be systematically explained. 
The major similarities between Japan’s colonial 
and ODA policy are 1) investing heavily in 
economic infrastructures, 2) investing in human 
capital, 3) developing raw materials, and 4) using 
Japanese currency for grants and loans.
(1) Investing Heavily in Economic 
Infrastructure
　　　A sa l ient  feature o f  the sectora l 
allocation of Japan’s foreign aid was the 
emphasis on economic infrastructure. Economic 
infrastructure, especially in transport and 
energy, was 40 percent of Japan’s ODA over 
the decade, roughly twice the Development 
Ass i s t ance  Commi t t ee  (DAC)  average 
(Development Assistance Committee, 1996: 36). 
　　　The Japanese colonial governments spent 
a relatively large share of their budgets (Over 
30 % for Korea and Over 25 % for Taiwan)2 on 
economic infrastructure.  These investments in 
economic foundation were one of reasons that 
Taiwan and Korea could achieve rapid economic 
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growth in the postwar period (Haggard, 1990; 
Wade, 1990). 
(2)Investing in Human Capital
　　　Japan provided technical assistance as 
part of its ODA. The amount provided rose 
to 6. 0174 trillion dollars ( 42. 2% of the total 
ODA) in 1988 (Japan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1989: 155). Through programs such as 
the Trainee Acceptance Program, The Youth 
Invitation Program, and the Individual Expert 
Dispatch Program, Japan’s ODA attempted to 
increase specialized knowledge and technology 
in a wide range of fields, including government 
administration, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
min ing ,  manufactur ing ,  energy ,  pub l i c 
health and medicine, transportation, and 
communication. As for regional distribution, 
Japan allocates a large share of its technical 
assistance to Asia. In 1988, Asia received 42.2% 
compared with 13. 0% for Latin America, 7. 8% 
for Africa, 5. 1% for the Middle East, 2. 0% for 
Oceania and 0. 3% for Europe (Japan’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 1989:155).
　　　Japan’s colonial development policy also 
invested in improving health, education, and 
labor skills. According to S. Pao-San Ho, the 
Japanese colonial governments created healthier 
environments by “compulsory testing for and 
treatment of malaria, vaccination campaigns, 
supervised collection of human waste, and 
regular public health inspections.” (Ho, 1996: 
353)  As a result, the death rate in Taiwan 
declined from 33 to 19 deaths per 1, 000 between 
1906 and 1940. In Korea, death rates declined 
from 35 to 23 deaths per 1, 000 between 1910 
and 1940 (Ho, 1996: 352). The life expectancy at 
birth was also increased in Taiwan and Korea. 
From 1906 to 1940, the mean life expectancy 
of Taiwanese males increased at birth by 13. 4 
years to 41. 1, and that of Taiwanese females 
by 16.7 years to 45. 7. In Korea, life expectancy 
at birth reached 40. 4 for males and 41. 7 for 
females in 1940 (Ho, 1996: 380).
　　　Formal education in the colonies was 
also improved. In Taiwan, although one-third 
of school age ( 6- 14) children were in schools 
in 1930- 1931, 71 percent of children were in 
1943- 1944. Enrollment of Korean students in 
primary schools increased from 20, 000 in 1910, 
to 90, 000 in 1920, and 901,000 in 1937 (Ho, 1996: 
353).  Japan’s developmental policy in its colonial 
policy also emphasized obtaining technical 
assistance, instituting elementary education, 
developing and diffusing appropriate agriculture 
technology (Jacoby, 1996: 75).
(3) Emphasizing the Development of 
Natural Resources
　　　Raw material was important for Japan’
s colonial and ODA policy. “Foreign aid 
as a means of responding to raw material 
dependency is also a significant motivator of 
policy. Faced with a need for imported raw 
materials and access to export markets, and 
with recourse to military tools, Japan has openly 
used foreign aid to enhance security of supply” 
(Lincoln, 1993: 116). Indonesia and China have 
been two of Japan’s largest ODA recipients in 
the last two decades due to their rich resources. 
Japan also increased the volume of its ODA 
to the Middle East after oil prices increased in 
the 1970s, in order to reduce its vulnerability 
to higher petroleum prices. Japan’s ODA, thus, 
has been used for national economic security 
(Yasutomo, 1986).
　　　Like European colonial powers, Japan 
exploited natural resources from Asian colonies. 
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According to Louise Young, Japan envisioned 
“creating an autarkic trading sphere that would 
provide for self-efficiency in wartime” (Duus, 
Myers and Peattie, 1996: 84). Japan extracted 
coal, iron ore, salt, cotton, and wool from China. 
Japan also received sugar from Taiwan, cotton 
from Korea, oil from Indonesia, and iron from 
Malaysia (Ho, 1996).
(4)Using Japanese Currency
　　　Using Japanese currency for grants and 
loans for Japan’s ODA has not changed since 
the 1960s. Japan’s loans recipients have to 
obtain yen to repay the loans.  Arase, however, 
analyzed that it cannot be denied that yen 
credits were used, as before, as one aspect 
of an export promotion policy tied to natural 
resources for Japan. “The denomination of loans 
in yen, not then a freely convertible currency, 
preserved Japan’s foreign exchange reserves 
and tied procurement to Japan” (Arase, 1995: 
41). 
　　　Japan created the yen bloc in Manchuria 
and North China in the 1930s. The monetary 
bloc partly extended into French Indochina and 
the Netherlands East Indies later (Nakamura, 
1996:186). Forcing the use of Japanese currency 
was intended to promote an Asian regional 
economic bloc and enhance Japan’s economic 
control over the region. At the same time, Japan 
could maintain its foreign currency reserve. 
Analytical Framework of This Study
　　　The continuity in Japan’s colonial policy 
in the prewar period and foreign aid policy 
in the postwar period should be examined to 
determine the origin of Japan’s unique economic 
development approach. The bureaucratic politics 
approach can offer an explanation that assisted 
continuity since Japan did not experience 
radical discontinuity in its bureaucratic system 
after World War II. However, this analysis 
does not explain how the unique ODA policy 
was created and why the continuity happened. 
Historical institutionalism can analyze the 
features of Japan’s ODA policy in the postwar 
period since the same policy-choice continued 
through institutional development in the 
postwar period, which is incremental and 
path dependent. Yet institutionalism cannot 
explain why Japan’s ODA policy was different 
from other Western countries or the cause of 
the policy continuity. Institutions do not have 
preference or perspective of an issue, and 
Japanese political and economic institutions 
were not well established when the continuity 
occurred before and after the Second World 
War.   
　　　This study argues that the origin of the 
economic development approach in Japanese 
ODA was primarily caused by the ideas that 
the personnel held, which were institutionalized 
through organizational routines, and the 
unchanged bureaucratic political system in the 
postwar period enforced the ideas. Economic 
bureaucrats and business leaders in prewar 
and wartime held beliefs about economic 
development for Asia and Japan’s foreign 
policy. These beliefs included the importance 
of a self-help effort system, mutual interests 
between Japan and Asian countries, a state 
led economy and long-term development plans, 
efficient public-private cooperation, utilizing 
foreign capital and technology, and an aim 
to establish an Asian economic bloc in the 
future. These ideas were carried by economic 
bureaucrats and business leaders through 
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restructuring the domestic and international 
political and economic system. These ideas 
became government and business organizations’ 
properties because the ideas became gradually 
institutionalized in the domestic political and 
economic system. In the postwar period, the 
ideas have been enforced by stable Japanese 
bureaucratic politics. 
Ideas, Institutions and Intra-
organizational Learning
　　　This research applied the role of ideas 
and institutions to explain the continuity in 
Japan’s economic development policy. Norms 
and ideas shape and define the preference 
of actors.  State behavior is determined by 
ideas and shaped beliefs about what actions 
are legitimate and appropriate in international 
relations.  Interest is important to define 
a state’s behavior, and Ernst Haas argued, 
“Interests are not the opposite of ideas or 
values” (Haas, 1990:2). 
　　　　An actor’s sense of self - interest 
includes the desire to hedge against 
uncertainty, to minimize risk. One 
cannot have a notion of risk without 
some experience with choices that 
turned out to be less than optimal; 
one’s interests are shaped by one’s 
experiences. But one’s satisfaction with 
an experience is a function of what 
is ideally desired, a function of one’s 
values. Interests cannot be articulated 
without values, far from (ideal) values 
being pitted against (material) interests, 
interests are unintelligible without 
a sense of values-to-be realized. The 
interests to be realized by collaborative 
action are expression of the actors’ 
values (Haas, 1990:2). 
Thus, we should not ignore the role of ideas 
in policies since ideas can influence and shape 
interests that determine a nation’s behaviors. 
Thus, it is important to “seek to understand 
how preferences are formed and knowledge is 
generated, prior to the exercise of instrumental 
rationality” (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, 
1998:681).
　　　Epistemic communities, networks of 
knowledge-based experts, can also help states 
identify their interests (Hass, 1992).  Epistemic 
communities created by “professionals … who 
share a common causal model and a common 
set of political values” (Haas, 1990: 41) can 
exist not only in the international community 
but also in domestic political institutions and 
organizations. This study argues that Japan had 
a network of knowledge-based professionals in 
economic development among the economic 
bureaucracy, politicians, and business leaders. 
The ideas shared and consented to by the 
economic development approach experts have 
continued to be implemented as Japan’s foreign 
economic policies for Asia.
　　　When and how can ideas shape the 
perception and preference of actors? Ideas 
can be defined as “the kind of structured 
information that is offered by epistemic 
communities as a guide for action” (Haas, 
1990: 74). 3 The ideas are socially constructed 
because they come from “the international 
and domestic societies in which states are 
embedded”(Katzenstein, 1996: 23).  When ideas 
or knowledge become consensual, they would 
be expected to help decision makers define their 
interests (Haas, 1990:12).   Then, politicians and 
bureaucrats use power to translate knowledge-
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based interests into policy and programs (Haas, 
1990: 12).  The consensual knowledge that the 
decision-makers held is the independent variable 
of this study, thus, the ideas of Japan’s economic 
development approach. Japan’s economic 
development approach was shared by economic 
bureaucrats and business leaders through their 
experience and learning from colonial economic 
development policies. 
　　　How do ideas influence policy? The 
causal effect of ideas on policy is not easily 
identified, and the measurement of ideas, in 
particular, poses problems for causal modeling 
(Yee, 1996).  Yet ideas that became embedded 
in political institutions are well recognized as an 
important influence on policy outcomes (Haas, 
1990; Sikkink, 1991; Goldstein and Keohane, 
1993; Hall , 1986; Adler, 1987; Lumsdaine, 
1993).  Institutions are important because 
“powerful individuals are important for the 
adoption of ideas, but if these ideas do not find 
institutional homes, they will not be able to 
sustain themselves over the long term” (Sikkink, 
1991:248).
　　　How could ideas be institutionalized? 
Japanese political agents such as the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance 
assisted the institutionalization of ideas 
through organizational routines. Organizations 
develop routines based on standard operating 
procedures and organizational rules (Sagan, 
: 72).  The established routines are usually 
inflexible and allow incremental plans. Japanese 
bureaucracy developed strong biases that 
Japanese economic development policies are 
the most suitable and beneficial for other 
Asian counties and Japan itself .  This is 
because Japanese decision-makers believed 
in its economic development experience in its 
Asian colonies and continued to enhance the 
approach through Japan’s foreign aid policy. 
Three ministries and an agency, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Economic 
Planning Agency (EPA), major actors in 
Japan’s ODA policy making, enforced and did 
not change the ideas in the decision-making 
process that actors are “pulling” and “hauling” 
through bargaining situations. Thus, ideas 
became embedded in domestic institutions, 
and became Japanese custom and style that 
influenced the policy decision-making process 
( Sikkink, 1991: 21). Institutionalized ideas no 
longer required the presence of individuals to 
maintain their influence (Sikkink, 1991:250).
　　　However, “institutional and personnel 
continuity is necessary for ideas to become 
embodied in institutions and for the policies to 
be successfully implemented” (Sikkink, 1991:24). 
Chalmers Johnson argued that the continuities 
in Japan’s industrial policy tools over the prewar 
and postwar years can be explained by the 
continuity of people who executed the state’s 
industrial policy because “leaders of politics, 
banking, industry, and economic administration 
were prominent in public life before, during, and 
after the war” (1982:309).  The unique historical 
continuity that “Japan did not experience a 
radical discontinuity in its civilian bureaucratic 
and economic elites,” (Johnson, 1982: 113) can 
also explain the continuity of Japan’s economic 
development approach. In short, Japanese 
foreign policy decision-makers chose strategies 
shaped by their experience and learning 
rather than responding rationally to their 
external environment or structural imperatives 
(Goldgeier, 1994). 
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The Ideas of Japan’s Economic 
Development Approach
　　　Although Japan’s colonial and ODA 
pol ic ies had di f ferent object ives under 
the different domestic and international 
environments, they shared similarities to 
promote economic development in other 
Asian countries. The main purpose of colonial 
development policies was to support Japan 
against the Western powers. On the other hand, 
ODA policies to Asian countries were supposed 
to promote recipient countries’ economic 
development though there were Japan’s national 
interests to increase its economic expansion in 
Asia.   
　　　The economic development policies were 
mainly prepared by economic bureaucrats 
and business communit ies , 4 even whi le 
the military was taking control of Japan’s 
government before and during World War II. 
The bureaucrats and business leaders involved 
in colonial economic policy-making continued 
to influence ODA policies in the postwar 
period. “An economics-first policy was shared 
by the economic bureaucracies whose power 
was enormously enhanced through war-time 
economic planning and reinforced during the 
U.S. occupation” (Sudo, 1992: 36).  Chalmers 
Johnson pointed out that bureaucrats learned 
how industrial policy worked in prewar and 
wartime, and that there is direct continuity 
between prewar and postwar officials in 
Japan’s state bureaucracy. Nobusuke Kishi, for 
example, was once a Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry (MCI) officer who participated in 
colonial industrialization in Manchukuo. After 
World War II, Kishi became a prime minister 
who made efforts to rebuild better diplomatic 
relations with Asian nations through Japan’s 
ODA. 
　　　This study operationalized the ideas of 
Japan’s economic development approach in the 
following six categories: ( 1) promoting a self-help 
effort (Jijyo Doryoku) system; ( 2) seeking mutual 
interests between Japan and Asian countries; ( 3) 
a state led economy and long-term development 
plans; ( 4) efficient public-private cooperation; 
( 5) utilizing foreign capital and technology; ( 6) 
an aim to establish Asian economic bloc in the 
future.
(1) Promoting a Self-help Effort (Jijyo 
Doryoku) System
　　　Sustainable development should be 
achieved by economic cooperation between 
local governments and external partners. Local 
government should increase their capacities 
to be self-sufficient. In other words, local 
participation and efforts are indispensable 
for their successful development. The role of 
external partners is to help and provide what 
local ownerships need for their sustainable 
development. Foreign capital and advice, 
especially advanced technology from more 
developed countries , would not be used 
effectively if there were not the willingness and 
commitments of local politicians and technocrats 
to carry their own economic development 
projects. Therefore, Japanese colonial and ODA 
policy invested in human capital to promote a 
self-help effort economic system.  
　　　The self-help effort system was established 
in Japan in the Meiji era. Foreign advisers were 
hired and paid greater salaries than the prime 
minister while Japan did not have much foreign 
exchange earnings. The Japanese government 
made efforts to gain advanced foreign technology 
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and methods to catch up to Western countries 
(Kohama, 1998:56).  The existence of a self-help 
spirit was present not only among politicians 
and bureaucrats but among citizens, as well. 
　　　Investing in human capital is also 
important to promote a self-help effort in 
developing countries. In the prewar period, 
J apane s e  c o l on i a l  g ove rnmen t s  made 
considerable improvements in education and 
health systems since an illiterate, unskilled, 
and unhealthy population would not sustain 
successful economic development. The efforts 
to raise labor productivity did not significantly 
appear during the colonial period. Ho pointed 
out that “investments in elementary education 
during the late 1920s and the 1930s may 
have had a greater impact on post-colonial 
development than on economic growth during 
the colonial period” (Ho, 1996:345).
(2) Seeking Mutual Interests between 
Japan and Asian Countries
　　　Japan’s economic development approach 
was created based on the idea of “sharing 
prosperity through co-existence (Kyozon 
Kyoei).” The national interests of Japan and 
other Asian countries achieved through the 
economic development approach were not 
mutually exclusive but compatible. For example, 
Japanese colonial and ODA policy encouraged 
the development of natural resources because 
Japan could enhance economic security due 
to its high dependence on raw materials while 
Asian countries could increase exports and earn 
foreign currency. Thus, promoting economic 
development in Asia is intended to seek mutual 
interests between Japan and Asian countries 
because Japan can achieve comprehensive 
security and increase its trade and investment 
to Asia while Asian countries enjoy prosperity.  
(3) State Led Economy and Long-Term 
Development Plans
　　　The active role of government participation 
in the economy is one of the features of the 
Japanese development approach (Ohno and Ohno, 
1998).  Government intervention is important 
during economic crisis even for developed 
countries. A government should also prioritize 
its national interests, especially its long-term 
economic growth and the maintenance of a 
stable economy. Economic growth can be 
initiated and the supported through strong 
government efforts to establish economic 
infrastructure, to increase investment in 
human resources, and to increase productivity. 
Although the expanding economic infrastructure 
is indispensable for industrialization, it is usually 
too costly and risky for private companies. The 
effective government for latecomer countries 
could be authoritarian rather than democratic. 
Since either a dependable bureaucracy or a 
stable legislature is desirable for strong state 
leadership in economic development, achieving 
political development, including political freedom 
and human rights, might be delayed. 
　　　Though the World Bank preferred 
short-term projects, long-term orientation is a 
distinguishing characteristic of Japan’s approach. 
It is important to set long-term economic 
development plans since economic growth, 
saving, industrial structure, an export base, 
and technology cannot be achieved in the short 
term (Ohno and Ohno, 1998: 5).   To implement 
Japan’s ODA policy successfully, it is a priority 
that aid recipients have a politically stable and 
strong government capable of planning and 
implementing long-term economic development 
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(4)Efficient Public − Private Cooperation
　　　Frequent communication and information 
exchange between government and business 
helped draft and implement better economic 
policies. Additional information and research 
to face uncertain markets and international 
competition was indispensable for a late 
industrialized country. “Efficient public-
private cooperation” means that bureaucrats, 
politicians, and business people can work 
together to achieve national interests. Business 
leaders might also be forced to give up short-
term profits to enhance long-term economic 
development plans under a government’s 
guidance.  
(5) Utilizing Foreign Capital and 
Technology
　　　To maximize economic development, 
Japan’s economic development approach did not 
hesitate to use foreign capital and technology. 
Even in its colonial development policy, 
Japan made efforts to gather more funds and 
advanced technology. This approach differs 
from other Western countries’ colonial policies. 
Colonies under Western countries did not 
achieve rapid industrialization as in Manchuria 
since there was little transfer of advanced 
technology, technicians, or capital.
(6) Aim to Establish an Asian Economic 
Bloc in the Future
　　　Japan’s development approach had 
been oriented to establish an Asian economic 
bloc. In the prewar period, Japan attempted 
to create the Yen bloc in North Asia because 
Japan needed to establish an autarkic system 
to serve the trend toward economic blocs in 
the world market. In the postwar period, Japan 
only used yen for ODA to maximize utility 
of its own currency among Asian countries 
since Japan wanted to take a leadership role 
in the Asian economic bloc.  Also, creating 
an Asian economic bloc provided for Japan’s 
comprehensive security. Japan supported and 
encouraged economic development in Asia, such 
as expanding markets for goods and services 
and bringing political stability to the region.
Methodology
　　　This study applies a comparative case 
study. 6 Selecting observations for testing the 
causal effect of ideas on policy requires cautious 
consideration because ideas are endogenous 
under some circumstance (King, Keohane and 
Verba, 1994:191).  Ideas may be able to explain 
policies, but they could also result from these 
policies. Or ideas might be correlated with “a 
causal prior omitted variable”. To solve this 
particular problem, King, Keohane and Verba 
suggest “the observed dependent variable 
(policies) and explanatory variable (ideas held by 
individuals) must be compared with a precisely 
defined counterfactual situation in which the 
explanatory variable takes on a different value”
(King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 191).  This 
study, therefore, chose a comparative analysis 
that should clarify whether ideas are exogenous 
or endogenous.
　　　To investigate Japan’s colonial economic 
development approach, this study chose 
Manchuria in China ( 1932- 1945) for a case 
study. In the prewar and wartime period, 
international politics was characterized as an 
unstable multipolar system. The United States 
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did not provide an effective impact on Japan’s 
foreign policy though it increased its presence 
in the postwar period. Domestic politics in 
Japan in the prewar and wartime period was 
an authoritarian government that depended 
on military force to achieve economic national 
security by means of imperialism.
　　　Japan’s foreign aid policy was also 
examined with a case study of Indonesia. This 
study examined ODA, focusing on the period 
from 1965 to 1990,  while Japan was under a 
bipolar system in international politics until the 
Cold War was over. The Asian regional balance 
of power system also changed after the end of 
World War II because China joined the regional 
balance-of-power system. The United States 
increased political leverage on Japan’s foreign 
policy. The domestic political system was 
reconstructed to democracy, and bureaucrats 
secured the essential role in the public and 
foreign policy decision-making process. 
　　　Desp i t e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c h a ng e s  i n 
international and domestic political variables, 
Japan’s economic development approach 
in colonial and foreign aid policies were 
systematically compared. The level of analysis 
for this study is, thus, approach. In this 
research, approach, strategy, and policy are 
interchangeable concepts. Research data was 
gathered through government documents, 
archives, and interviews. Each case study also 
examines who was involved in the decision-
making process of the economic development 
approach (especially continuity of personnel), 
and how Japan’s economic development 
approach was implemented.
Case Study 1: Japan’s Colonial Policy 
in Manchuria 
　　　For a case study in the prewar period, 
this study focuses on economic development 
in Manchuria between 1932 and 1945. In 1931, 
the Japanese Kwantung Army instigated 
the Manchurian Incident, providing for the 
creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo 
within Manchuria, and Japan therefore gained 
the relative autonomy to draft and implement 
its own comprehensive economic development 
plans. after 1932, the Manchukuo government 
under Japan’s colonial policy sought rapid 
industrialization toward economic self-sufficiency 
and promoted massive migration from Japan to 
create the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Bloc. As 
a result, the Japanese population in Manchuria 
increased to over one million in 1940 (Manshikai, 
1964:84), while the total population in Manchuria 
was approximately 43 million (Kinney, 1982:4). 
　　　Japan undertook significant industrialization 
in its colony, Manchukuo, unlike other Western 
imperial nations. Even Great Britain did not 
attempt to transfer advanced technology 
and industry in India. The typical pattern of 
western colonization focused on development 
of traditional local manufacturing and basic 
agricultural production.  Japan, however, 
started new heavy industries in Manchukuo 
(Myers, 1996: 137).   Industrialization of colonies 
was part of Japan’s competition with more 
advanced powers in the global economy since 
the increasing world trend toward economic 
blocs forced Japan to create its own autarkic 
territory (Cumming, 1984: 488- 9).  Japan’s 
colonial development policy was, thus, unique 
and included a long-term foreign policy agenda.   
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Economic Development Approach
1) Self -help Effort system: According to 
the Outl ines for Economic Construction 
in Manchukuo (Manshu Keizai Kensetsu 
Koyo), Japan intended to promote a self-
help effort system in Manchukuo so that the 
Chinese people would participate and make 
commitments for sustainable development 
projects. Also, the Japanese government 
intended to create an independent state in 
Manchuria since the state could serve as a 
counter force against the Soviet Union and 
the force of Chinese nationalism (Nakagane, 
1996:133).  To raise technicians and professionals 
for economic development, Japan’s government 
invited Chinese students to study in Japan. 
The numbers of Chinese students who came to 
Japan were 1, 844 in 1937, 1, 255 in 1941, and 933 
in 1944  (Manshu Kokushi Kankokai, 1971:1104). 
These students attended Japanese universities, 
vocational schools, and high schools. In addition, 
Japan took serious efforts in urban planning for 
the Manchukuo state. 
　　　The social and city infrastructures were 
more modern than the existing system in Japan 
at the time.  One of the basic principles for 
Japan’s economic development policies was that 
spending money and energy on urban planning 
was a long-term investment for building and 
sustaining a self-help economic system.  Basic 
human needs like clean water and better public 
health were provided in Manchukuo. Japan’s 
development approach attempted to provide 
Chinese people a better standard of living 
to promote their participation in economic 
development plans.   
2 )  Mutual Interests between Japan and 
Manchuria: Japan seized Manchuria as a 
colony partly due to rich natural resources in 
Manchuria. The Japanese Army attempted to 
link Manchurian industrialization with national 
defense, and manage the development and 
conservation of strategic resources. Mining 
coal, iron, magnetite, and other material was 
proposed by the Manchukuo government’s 
Economic Construction Program. The program 
also proposed refining and manufacturing 
the materials on site. The Japan-Manchuria 
Economic Bloc was, therefore, envisioned to 
create a self-sufficient economy and an autarkic 
trade sphere (Young, 1998:204).  
　　　Establ ish ing soc ia l  and economic 
infrastructures was also essential since Japan 
could promote economic development in 
Manchuria and then increase its trade and 
investment with Manchuria. Improving social 
and economic infrastructures provides a better 
life for local people and encourages foreign 
investments because it would be easy to 
transfer personnel and technology.  Colonial 
policy has never been based on moral and 
humanitarian obligation. However, unlike 
other Western colonial powers, Japan located 
various heavy industries such as steel, chemical, 
and hydro-electric power in its colonies. 
Since the foundation of economic and social 
infrastructures was indispensable for successful 
economic development, the aforementioned 
Out l ines for  Economic Construct ion in 
Manchukuo specif ied basic construction 
targets including improvement of railways, 
harbor facilities, transportation on rivers, 
roads, telecommunication, air routes, and urban 
planning (Nishizawa, 1995:378). 
　　　At a result, the Manchurian railway 
network was extended by 6, 354. 2 kilometers. 
After adding other extended lines ( 6489. 9km), 
the total length of new lines was 11, 044. 1km 
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exceeding the or iginal  target of  10 , 000 
kilometers in ten years. The new rail lines 
improved strategic access, and developed new 
trade routes through Korea. In addition, the 
new lines helped develop the timber industry 
in Northern Manchuria, and expanded the 
influence of Japanese military and commercial 
penetration to the former Russian territory 
(Young, 1998: 244).  In addition to building new 
tracks, the Manchukuo government developed 
the high-speed train “Asia Express.” The Asia 
Express ran between Dalian and Hsinjing 
traveling at an average speed of 81 kilometers 
per hour. The highest speed was 150 kilometers 
an hour, making the Asia Express the fastest 
train in the world at the time (Manshu Kokushi 
Kankokai, 1971:850).  
　　　 Since roads needed urgent improvement, 
the Manchukuo government prior i t ized 
upgrading the road system in Manchukuo 
under the Five-Year Economic Development 
Plans. Flood control especially was the most 
urgent project because it was almost impossible 
to drive through the state in summer due to 
severe flooding (Manshu Kokushi Kankokai, 
1971: 949).   Also there were no reliable bridges 
in Manchukuo. Therefore, construction of 
solid bridges was another of the priorities for 
economic development.  By the end of the 
Manchukuo regime, Japanese civil engineers 
had bui lt  41 (the total length of 10 , 000 
kilometers) concrete or steel bridges.   Although 
the road system was improved, the Manchukuo 
government only reached one-fourth of the 
original target of 60, 000 kilometers. 
　　　Most of all, the Manchukuo government 
took urbanization projects for economic 
development seriously, and installed urban 
infrastructure in the capital city, Hsinking. 
Wide tree-lined boulevards, a war memorial, 
the palace of the emperor, and a train station 
were built. In addition, Hsinking had botanical 
gardens, decorative lakes and streams, a zoo, 
and other amenities. By the end of the first 
phase of construction in 1937, there were 105 
new public buildings, including 17 for the 
Manchukuo government and 88 for other 
corporations, 3, 000 special residences, 5, 550 
ordinary buildings, 1, 067 rental office units, 
and 421 other houses (Young, 1998: 244- 50). 
The Manchukuo government promoted urban 
development projects in 48 cities between 1932 
and 1938. Yet most other cities gained the basic 
essentials such as running water and sewage 
systems, gas and electricity, telephone and 
telegraph lines, and a road network connecting 
to the railway station. The government also 
created parks, public squares, sports facilities, 
hospitals, and Japanese cemeteries for newly 
developed cities (Young, 1998: 245).  As a 
result, a significant improvement of the social 
and economic infrastructure was brought to 
the Manchurian people by Japan’s colonial 
governance. 
3) Sate-led Economy and long-term development 
plans :  Under the strong government ,  a 
modified controlled economy and two Five-
Year Economic Development Plans were 
chosen for Manchurian rapid industrialization. 
The Guidelines for Controlled Industries 
(Sangyo Tosei no Taiko) was announced in 
1934 to control industries closely related to 
Japan’s national defense and important and 
basic industries for Manchurian economic 
development. “Special” and “semi-special” 
companies were joint-stock companies with 
public and private capital, and they were 
created to manage important industries. It 
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was called the “one enterprise managing one 
industry” (Ichigyo Ichisha Shugi) system. This 
“designated a single enterprise or joint-stock 
company as the agent to coordinate an entire 
industry on a vertical and horizontal production 
and distribution basis. Each special company 
had a director and vice-director appointed by 
the General Affairs Office, with the necessary 
business experience and administrative skills” 
(Myers, 1996).
　　　Two Five-Year Economic Development 
Plans were the vehicles for Japan’s colonial 
economic development approach.  The first 
one was successfully enforced between 1937 
and 1941, and the second was incomplete but 
practiced from 1942 to the end of World War 
II. According to the Outlines for Manchukuo’s 
Five-Year Industr ia l  Development Plan 
(Manshu Sangyo Kaihatsu Gokanen Keikaku 
Koyo), Five-Year Plans specifically aimed at 
1)the development of natural resources for 
preparation for wars; 2)the establishment of a 
self-help economy while supplying resources 
to a needy Japan; 3)the foundation of the 
infrastructure for industrial development 
in Manchukuo (Kobayashi, 1996: 134). The 
Five-Year Plans attempted to maximize 
industrialization to enable Manchukuo to 
manufacture its own weapons, munitions, 
aircraft, and vehicles, unlike other colonies. 
Steel, chemicals, and machine tools were also 
produced more than ever. The Five-Year Plans 
also had ambitious and specific targets for each 
area of industrial production. For example, 
the plan indicated the present capability of 
production for iron (. 85 million tons), the target 
production (2. 53 million tons), and the necessary 
capital ( 1. 17 billion yen) (Kobayashi, 1996:134). 
4) Efficient public and private cooperation: 
The exchange of information and frequent 
communication between government and 
business helped draft and implement better 
economic policies. Although this system was 
formally established in Japan after World 
War II as the Singikai system, Kobayashi, 
political economist, argues that this productive 
government-business cooperation system was 
first introduced in Manchukuo (Kobayashi, 
Okazaki, Yonekawa and the NHK research 
group; 1995: 223- 6).  The close relationship 
among economic bureaucrats, business people 
and military officials was observed through 
important pol icy-making processes .  For 
example, Nobusuke Kishi, a subsequent deputy 
chief of the General affairs Office, had dinner 
meetings with business people, and military 
officers every night for his three-year stay in 
Manchuria. The new and important projects 
that would reform the South Manchurian 
Rai lway Company (Mantetsu) and bui ld 
Manchurian Heavy Industries (Mangyo) were 
discussed and decided in details by three 
people, Nobusuke Kishi, Yoshisuke Aikawa, the 
president of Nissan Corporation, and Yosuke 
Matsuoka, the president of Mantetsu (Kobayashi, 
Okazaki, Yonekawa and the NHK research 
group; 1995: 223-6: 50). The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Japan also attempted to promote 
cooperation between top business executives 
and economic bureaucrats in Manchuria 
(Matsumoto, 1992:6). 
5) Foreign capital and technology: In the 
a forement ioned Out l ines  for  Economic 
Construction in Manchukuo, foreign capital 
and technology were welcomed for economic 
development projects ,  a l though foreign 
investments, especially from the United States, 
had never arrived.  Though the United States 
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did not invest much in Manchuria before 1932, 
Japan wanted the United States to be more 
interested in investing for two reasons.  First, 
Japan simply needed more capital for economic 
development projects in Manchuria. Second, 
Japan wanted approval from the United 
States that Manchukuo was an independent 
state, while the United State could profit in 
Manchuria. Japan thought that it would be 
easier to get the support from the United States 
if both states shared common economic gains in 
Manchuria (Cho, 1971:116). 
　　　The Manchukuo government decided 
to ask for loans, technology, and construction 
business deals for the new capital city from 
France. Originally, 22. 25 million yen of the 
total budget of 43 million yen was planned for 
loans. However, the Kwantung Army opposed 
the use of foreign capital , and Mantetsu 
opposed loans for city planning and the use of 
French developers for design and construction. 
Although the Manchukuo government argued 
that the loans could be diplomatic tools to invite 
France to Japan’s side while the international 
environment against Japan was getting worse, 
the total budget for city planning was reduced 
to about 30 million yen, and 5 million yen was 
loaned from France. The 5 million yen was used 
only to build and fix the government offices. 
Thus, although the Outlines for Economic 
Construction in Manchukuo sought to apply 
the open-door and equal-opportunity policies for 
capital and technology from other industrialized 
countries, foreign capital and technology were 
not used for the actual city planning (Cho, 
1971:209-10).  
　　　The president of Nissan Corporation, 
Yoshisuke Aikawa, thought that foreign 
capital and technology were necessary for 
comprehensive economic development in 
Manchukuo. Aikawa originally planned to 
obtain 250 million dollars worth of investments 
from the United States to establish Manchurian 
Heavy Industries (Mangyo) (Johnson, 1982: 133). 
However, since the war against China broke 
out and the international community criticized 
Japan’s conduct, Aikawa had to give up on 
his plan to go to the United States to invite 
investment in Manchuria. Domestic criticism 
against foreign capital in Manchuria did not stop 
Aikawa (Manshu Kokushi Kankokai, 1971: 551). 
Though the idea of using foreign capital and 
technology was there from the beginning, 
domestic and international constraints held back 
the plan. If foreign capital and technology had 
been available, the development plans would 
have had a greater scale of industrialization in 
Manchukuo.  
6) Establishing Asian Economic Bloc: Japanese 
military, intellectuals, and politicians created 
many concepts to justify Japanese imperialism, 
including the establishment of an Asian 
economic bloc. The ideas were called the New 
Order in East Asia, the Japan-Manchuria 
Economic Bloc, the East Asian League, the 
East Asian Cooperative Community, the Japan-
Manchuria-China Bloc Economy, the East Asian 
Coordinated Economy, the New Economic 
Structure, and the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. Since Japan needed more 
raw materials, markets, and land to solve its 
domestic population problems, Kwantung army 
officers sought to create a new kind of economic 
system in Asia that could be integrated with 
Japan’s economy.  Establishing the Japan-
Manchuria Economic Bloc was, in particular, 
one of the most important goals for economic 
development plans in Manchukuo. The idea of 
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continental expansion for Japanese economic 
security was also at the core of Japan’s foreign 
policy at that time. “The integrated industrial 
and trading unit formed with the Japan-
Manchuria bloc economy was extended first 
to include north China, then the rest of China, 
and finally Southeast Asia in a self-sufficient 
yen bloc” (Young, 1998: 50).   The Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was the final and 
authorized product of Japan’s foreign policy, in 
particular, to justify entering World War II. 
Case Study 2: ODA Policy for 
Indonesia (Focusing Between 1965-
1990)
　　　This study chose Indonesia as a case 
study because Indonesia is located in Asia 
and Indonesia became Japan’s largest Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) recipient 
country between 1965 and 19907. Japan’s ODA 
to Indonesia is examined to compare with its 
colonial policy in Manchuria in the prewar 
period. Although there are significant changes 
in the international and domestic political 
system, continuities in Japan’s economic 
development approach in the prewar and 
postwar periods are articulated through 
comparison of two case studies. 
Economic Development Approach
1)Self-help Effort System: Between 1954 and 
1990, Japan’s ODA and technical assistance 
personnel had mostly gone to Indonesia. 
The total amount of technical assistance to 
Indonesia was 116,266, 168 yen, and the number 
of Japanese specialists, including technicians 
and researchers, was 13, 654. At the same 
time, Japan invited Indonesian people to Japan 
to study or receive vocational training. The 
number of these Indonesian students was 
8, 957, and this number was also the largest 
among countries receiving technical assistance 
from Japan (Japan International Cooperation 
agency (JICA), 1998: 119, 267).  Kimio Fujita, 
President of the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), assessed that Japan’s ODA for 
improving human resources was necessary and 
effective for economic development in Indonesia 
since the Dutch colonial government did not 
have any educational policy for the Indonesian 
people. A number of current Indonesian political 
and business leaders have received Japan’s 
technical and educational assistance (Sugimoto, 
1999:41).  
　　　One of the major characteristics of 
Japan’s ODA was the large ratio of Yen loans 
to developing countries compared to its grant 
aid. Japan has offered Yen loans at low interest 
rates with long repayment periods. Japan’s 
economic assistance has been criticized since 
other donor countries provide more grant aid, 
and it seems that Japan is doing business with 
poor countries. However, Japan believed that 
repayments of ODA loans should promote the 
self-help effort system in developing countries. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Japan’s ODA 
stated, “The significance of ODA loans is that 
it meets large-scale demands for funds and 
imposes the obligation to make repayments, 
thus, support developing countries in making 
self -help efforts to become economically 
independent” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994: 
149). This idea came out from Japan’s own 
experience in the postwar period. Since Japan 
received loans from the World Bank, it could 
finish establishing economic infrastructures, in 
particular, in the transportation sector. 
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2 )Mutua l  Interests  between Japan and 
Indonesia: ODA has become one of the central 
pillars of Japan’s foreign policy since the foreign 
aid policy was recognized as a comprehensive 
security policy to achieve Japan’s national 
interests in the long term.8  Providing ODA 
to raw material suppliers and using ODA to 
establish economic infrastructure in Asian 
countries to increase Japanese investments 
and trade was especia l ly important for 
enhancing Japanese economic security policy. 
As Indonesian oil had been an important target 
for Japanese colonial and policy, ODA was used 
as a means of increasing access to Indonesian 
raw materials. For example, the Japanese 
government provided equipment and services 
to develop an Indonesian oil field, the first 
project for ODA loans through OECD (Arase, 
1995: 45). The first projects for development 
of natural resources for JICA were also in 
Indonesia in 1970 (JICA, 1998).  Indonesia was 
the largest recipient of Japan’s ODA between 
1965 and 1990 because of its rich raw materials, 
especially oil (Lincoln, 1993: 115-7).
　　　A large amount of Japan’s ODA to 
Indonesia had been spent to establish economic 
infrastructures, much like the colonial policies. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ ODA report 
stated ,  “From the long-term viewpoint , 
developing countries need to enhance their 
social and economic infrastructure, which 
enables them to achieve sustained economic 
development, in order to realize economic 
independence and eliminate poverty.” (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 1995: 149)  The largest 
percentage of Japan’s ODA project loans 
went to Indonesian economic infrastructures 
such as construction of transportation, power 
plants, and telecommunication.  Between 1966 
and 1990, nearly 47 percent of ODA loans was 
spent for economic infrastructure in Indonesia. 
Japan was also willing to provide economic 
assistance to the Indonesian government to 
reduce its heavy financial burden.  In 1968, the 
budget for economic development was 41. 5 
billion rupiah, with 25. 7 billion rupiah planned 
for infrastructures. Indonesia depended on this 
financial support from Japan to carry out its 
economic development plans.9 
3) State-led Economy and Long-term Development 
Plans: President Suharto introduced the 
Twenty-five Year Economic Development Plan 
in 1969. This long-term plan was divided into 
five-year periods so that the fifth Five-year 
Development Plan ended in 1994. Compared to 
Sukarno’s regime, the political and economic 
system had been liberalized under Suharto’
s administration, yet a state led development 
strategy was adapted for rapid industrialization. 
Major industries including oil were still run by 
the Indonesian government. The authoritarian 
developmental state was establ ished by 
President Suharto, and the Japanese government 
supported that regime. The developmental 
state provided political stability and long-
term national economic planning for economic 
development in Indonesia. 
　　　Japan had assisted the Indonesian 
government, which did not have a democratic 
pol i t ica l  system, and intervened in the 
market. The Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund (OECF), an implementing agency of 
Japan’s ODA loans, “carries out studies of 
macroeconomic conditions and of various 
sectors of a recipient country based on its 
national development plan and/or its five year 
development plan. This information is used to 
analyze development issues and identify the 
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priority of projects through policy dialogue” 
(Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 1998:32). 
4) Efficient Public and Private Cooperation: The 
Shingikai system, one of the characteristics 
of Japan’s politics, began to work effectively 
in the Manchukuo state. Shingikai consists of 
representatives from private sectors to advise 
bureaucrats in making feasible and effective 
policies. This mechanism can incorporate private 
sector views into bureaucratic viewpoints so 
that efficient public and private cooperation also 
brings successful implementation of policies. 
The Shingikai system was also introduced in 
Japan’s ODA policy.    
　　　The Asian Economic Deliberation Council 
(Ajia Keizai Kondankai) was formed in 1953. It 
was “under the chairmanship of Yasusaburo 
Hara, an eminent Asia-oriented business leader 
from the Mitsui group. This officially sponsored 
policy deliberation council composed of business 
executives and government officials helped 
to institutionalize the close linkage of the 
government and the private sector in economic 
cooperation (keizai kyoryoku)”(Arase, 1995: 27). 
One of the achievements of this council was 
creating the Asian Association (Ajia Kyokai). 
By the joint sponsorship of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), 
the Asia Association was staffed by retired 
bureaucrats, active and retired government 
economists, and engineers and professionals, 
many from the old South Manchurian Railroad 
Research Department. The association took 
responsibility for handling Japan’s tasks in 
the Colombo Plan and research into the Asian 
economies (Arase, 1995:42). 
　　　For effective economic development 
in Indonesia and achieving Japan’s national 
interests, in particular its economic interest, 
the Foreign Economic Cooperation Advisory 
Council (Taigai Keizai Kyoryoku Shingikai) was 
reorganized in 1965. This council was originally 
formed to monitor new organizations for 
Japan’s economic assistance in 1961. Although 
the council was at first chaired by the prime 
minister, cabinet members and prominent 
business people attended the council meetings, 
and later the president of the Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry took the chairmanship 
with Saburo Okita as the vice-chairman (Arase, 
1995:42, 61).  The Foreign Economic Cooperation 
Advisory Council had been involved in Japan’s 
ODA policy-making by issuing reports and 
opinions to prime ministers. 
5)Foreign Capital and Technology: Japan did 
not exclude participation from other countries 
to assist economic development in Asia. The 
Southeast Asian Development Cooperation 
Fund was proposed by Pr ime Minister 
Nobusuke Kishi in 1957 to promote economic 
development in Southeast Asia. The idea of this 
fund was to gather more capital and technology 
for Asian developing countries; however, the 
United States did not approve of this idea. 
　　　Japan joined the multilateral aid group 
for a comprehensive economic development plan 
in Indonesia. In 1967, the Inter-government Group 
on Indonesia (IGGI) was created by twelve 
non-communist countries and international 
organizations to support Indonesian economic 
development. 10  Japan was one of the major 
donors to the IGGI based on the one-third 
formula. Japan committed 50 million US dollars 
to rescue Indonesia from a financial crisis in 
1967. The United States arranged a loan of 45. 5 
million US dollars at the same time (Yamada, 
1998: 27- 8).  The IGGI members discussed 
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technical and financial assistance to Indonesian 
economic development while coordinating donor 
interests.  
6)Asian Economic Bloc: Establishing an Asian 
economic bloc like the EC in Europe was 
considered the long-term aim to assist economic 
development in Asia. Although the Pacific 
Basin Community Plan was officially introduced 
by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in 1978, 
the idea of a regional bloc in the Pacific Basin 
had been discussed since 1968. 11 As already 
noted, more than 60 percent of Japan’s ODA 
concentrated on Asian countries because Japan 
used ODA not simply to develop new sources 
of supply and to open new markets but more 
broadly to integrate the Asian-Pacific region 
under Japanese leadership (Waltz, 1993: 58). 
Japan wanted an institutional economic and 
military framework for cooperation in the 
Asian-Pacific region, similar to NATO and the 
EC in Europe (Funabashi, 1992: 63).
　　　Promoting economic development in 
Asia was also part of Japan’s comprehensive 
security policy. Poverty, undeveloped medical 
care, public health, and educational systems 
might cause conflicts between North and 
South countries. To avoid wars and create 
a peaceful international environment, Japan 
should increase its economic assistance to 
Asia. 12  In particular, economic assistance to 
Southeast Asia was considered vital to promote 
economic development. To stabilize economic 
systems in Southeast Asia, Japan recognized its 
responsibility to offer long-term financial and 
technical assistance to the region.13 
　　　Establishment of the Asia Development 
Bank (ADB) was primarily to promote regional 
economic development. The ADB’s fund was 
planned to effectively develop resources in Asia, 
and to promote balanced economic development 
and expansion of trade in the regional bloc.14  
Japan attempted to take a leadership role in 
the organization by sharing more financial costs 
and voting rights, providing the location for the 
headquarters, and the presidency of the ADB 
(Yasutomo, 1983, Wan, 1995).  Although the 
headquarters were not built in Tokyo, the ADB 
president has always been Japanese. However, 
since the idea of creating a regional economic 
bloc and obtaining the leadership role was 
similar to the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere,” Japan was careful not to offend other 
members of the ADB. 15 The Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) was founded in 
1989. Although the APEC philosophy was the 
idea of “open regionalism,” the organization was 
to promote economic cooperation among Asian 
countries. The APEC could be established 
since many Asian countries achieved economic 
development. 
Research Findings
　　　This study discovered signif icant 
continuity in personnel in Japan’s colonial and 
ODA policies despite major changes in the 
domestic and international political systems. 
Continuity of personnel in decision-making 
organizations was chosen by the United States 
and Japanese governments, and the idea of the 
economic development approach was carried 
forward by the continued decision-makers 
through their learning and experience.  As seen 
in Table 1, the organizational framework of the 
decision-making process changed between two 
policies before and after World War II.  Each 
policy had different players in bureaucracy, 
think-tanks, and political parties. However, the 
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Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) in 
the prewar and war time period became the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) after World War II. The bureaucrats 
in MCI continued to be involved in foreign 
economic policies through staying in MITI 
or becoming politicians. For example, though 
Nobusuke Kishi and Etsusaburo Shiina were 
MCI officers in the prewar period, they became 
politicians after World War II (Table 1). 
　　　The continuity in personnel in the policy-
making process explains why and how the ideas 
of Japan’s economic development approach 
were institutionalized. For example, Kishi was 
the most influential person in organizational 
continuity. While he was prime minister, Kishi 
created his own faction in the LDP, which 
carried his agenda and policy choices and 
raised other prime ministers. Takeo Fukuda 
belonged to Kishi faction, and succeeded to 
Kishi’s personal connections in Japan and 
foreign countries. Fukuda made efforts to 
reconstruct Japan’s Asian diplomacy like 
Kishi did with the South Asian Development 
Cooperation Fund.  Also ,  Japan did not 
experience a radical discontinuity in its civilian 
bureaucracy.  The unique history can explain 
the continuity of Japan’s economic development 
approach because institutionalized ideas no 
longer required the presence of individuals to 
maintain their influence.
　　　Since the colonial period in Manchuria, 
Japan’s economic development approach had 
been discussed and drafted in think-tanks or 
committees:  the Economic Research Association 
(ERA) in Mantetsu and the Japan-Manchukuo 
Finance-Economic Research Associat ion 
(JMFERA) for Manchurian development, and 
the Asian Economic Deliberation Council (AEDC) 
and Foreign Economic Cooperation Advisory 
Council (FECAC) for ODA policy. All the above 
advisory organizations were comprised of 
politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders to 
share information and discuss Japan’s national 
interests in Asian economic development.  
　　　In the Japanese business community, 
Yoshisuke Aikawa, Yutaka Kubota ,  and 
others continued to participate in decision-
making and the implementing of Japan’s 
economic development approach before and 
after World War II. They were significantly 
influential due to their personal connections 
with Asian political and business leaders, and 
their experience in the economic development 
projects in Japan’s colonized Asia.  In sum, the 
idea of economic development approach was 
shared among Japanese politicians, bureaucrats, 
and business leaders, and was institutionalized 
in the ODA community. Ideas have to become 
embedded in state institutions to be successfully 
implemented. In the case of Japanese ODA 
policy, personnel continuity and bureaucratic 
organizational routines institutionalized the 
ideas of economic development. The ideas 
were clearly identified in official documents 
continuously because they became embedded 
in the incremental and path dependent ODA 
bureaucratic politics system. Therefore, the 
Japanese economic development approach 
shaped by personal experience and learning 
explains the intellectual continuity that has 
become consolidated in Japan’s current ODA 
policy. 
　　　The institutionalized ideas of Japan’s 
economic development approach were analyzed 
mainly through Japan’s official documents and 
the minutes of Diet committees. As Table 2 
shows, the ideas continued to have influence, 
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from Japan’s colonial policy in Manchuria to 
its ODA policy, although there were some 
modif ications. One of the similarit ies in 
Japan’s colonial and ODA policies, investing 
in human resources, can be explained by the 
idea of supporting self-help efforts. All policies 
attempted to enhance the self-help effort system 
in Asian countries through different programs. 
The fellowships program had a long history 
that rose political and business leaders in Asian 
countries. While Japan expanded technical 
assistance and Yen loans to Asia in the postwar 
period, the idea of supporting the self-help 
efforts of developing countries had become 
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the most important aid philosophy, and was 
finally stated in the basic principles of Japan’s 
ODA Charter in 1992 (Nishigaki and Yasutani, 
1999:146). 
　　　The focus on development of natural 
resources and economic infrastructure projects 
is a salient similarity in Japan’s colonial and 
ODA policies. Enhancing the security of raw 
material supply was essential for Japanese 
foreign policy, and will continue to be important 
in the future. The development of colonial 
infrastructure and industrialization of colonies 
was part of Japan’s competition with more 
advanced powers in the global economy, since 
the increasing world trend toward an economic 
bloc forced Japan to create its own self-help 
territory. The trend toward a regional economic 
bloc reoccurred in the postwar period. Thus, the 
feature of investing in economic infrastructure 
in Japan’s colonial and aid policies is explained 
by the ideas of seeking mutual interests 
between Japan and Asian countries through 
the establishment an Asian economic bloc. 
First, Japan’s aid to establish infrastructure 
was important for economic development in 
developing counties due to their lack of skills 
and capital. Aid recipient countries cannot 
promote further industrialization without 
efficient transportation and telecommunication 
systems. Second, Japan could increase its 
investments and trade if economic development 
succeeded in the Asian developing countries. 
Japan especially needed to secure natural 
resources from Asian countries such as 
Table 2: Continuity and Change in Japan’s Economic Development Approach
Policy
Ideas
Colonial Policy for Manchuria ODA Policy for Indonesia
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Indonesia. Third, economic infrastructure 
development contributed not only economic but 
political stability since it improved local peoples’ 
standards of living. As a result, relations 
between Japan and Asian countries should 
improve and promote cooperation to establish 
an Asian economic bloc.   
　　　The active role of government was also 
particularly significant in Japan’s economic 
development approach .  Japan’s colonia l 
governments in Asia installed controlled 
economic systems, and Japan supported 
authoritarian governments in Asia to promote 
economic development in the postwar period. 
Strong governments were effective in the early 
stages of development for the Manchurian 
and Indonesian cases for two reasons. First, 
although they were not democratic, and human 
rights were violated, Manchuria and Indonesia 
maintained political stability, a premise for 
sustainable economic growth. Second, the 
politically stable governments could set long-
term national goals and enhance comprehensive 
economic development plans. Manchuria had 
two Five-Year Economic Plans, and Indonesia 
had the Eight-Year Economic Development Plan 
under Sukarno and Twenty-five Year Economic 
Development Plans under Suharto. 
　　　Efficient public and private cooperation 
systems for economic development were 
originated in the Meiji era. To catch up with 
Western industrialization, Japan had to enhance 
rapid and comprehensive economic development 
with limited resources.  The formulation of this 
cooperation as the Shingikai system occurred 
in Manchuria. Since then Japanese economic 
policies have been discussed and drafted 
between government and business leaders in 
various Shingikai meetings. 
　　　The case studies of Manchuria and 
Indones i a  showed  tha t  pub l i c - p r i va t e 
cooperation was a major feature of Japan’s 
economic development approach from decision-
making to implementation. In the prewar 
and wartime periods, the Economic Research 
Association (ERA) in Mantetsu and the Japan-
Manchukuo Finance-Economic Research 
Assoc iat ion ( JMFERA) for  Manchur ian 
development assisted in drafting colonial 
development policies. Mantetsu and Mangyo 
were joint-stock companies that implemented 
economic development plans in Manchuria. 
In the postwar period, the Asian Economic 
Deliberation Council (AEDC) and the Foreign 
Economic Cooperation Advisory Council 
(FECAC) were involved in decision-making 
for ODA policy. The public corporations, the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 
(OECF) were implementing agencies. 
　　　Utilizing foreign capital and technology 
was important in Japan’s colonies and their 
domestic economic development since Japan 
was about twenty years behind European and 
American developments. The use of advanced 
foreign technology was not seen in Western 
countries’ colonies, and it shows that Japan 
was seriously engaged in Manchurian colonial 
development to promote industrialization. 
Although the idea of introducing French capital 
and technology for urban planning of Hsinking 
and American capital for the Five-Year 
Economic Development Plans was there, the 
Japanese government could not implement them 
due to objection from the Japanese military and 
international political circumstances. 
　　　In the postwar period, Japan became 
an aid recipient for its economic recovery, and 
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later became the largest aid-giving country. 
Japan received 0. 86 trillion US dollars in loans 
from the World Bank between 1953 and 1966. 
More than 60 percent of these loans was used 
for infrastructure (Nishigaki and Yasutani, 
1999: 141). Based on its own experience, Japan 
provided ODA to Asia through bilateral and 
multilateral methods, and made sure that 
developing countries could take advantage 
of technology and capital from industrialized 
nations. The case study of Indonesia showed 
that Japan joined the Inter-Government Group 
on Indonesia (IGGI), and played a significant role 
in supporting Indonesian economic development. 
Yet  Japan s t i l l  enhanced i t s  economic 
development approach in the multilateral 
framework. 
　　　The aim to establish an Asian economic 
bloc was one of the most important economic 
development approaches of Japan through 
the colonial and ODA policies. Creation of the 
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in 
wartime, and the Pacific Basin Community 
Plan (PBCP) and the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) in the postwar period, 
were build on the idea that Japan could achieve 
comprehensive security to survive trends of 
regionalism in world politics. Regional economic 
development secured the source of natural 
resources and promoted political stability for the 
foundation of an Asian economic bloc. Thus, the 
idea of seeking mutual interests between Japan 
and Asian countries also aimed at establishing 
an Asian economic bloc.  Attempting to 
establish the Yen bloc in Asia during wartime, 
and the usage of Yen for grants and loans of 
its ODA in the postwar period, was designed 
to promote regional economic cooperation, and 
Japan was willing to play the leadership role in 
an Asian economic bloc.  
Conclusion
　　　This  s tudy examined how Japan 
enhanced its economic development approach 
in Asia through colonial and ODA policies over 
one hundred years. Although there are some 
changes, the basic ideas of Japan’s economic 
development approach still exist in the current 
ODA policy. However, what would have 
happened if Japan’s ODA policy did not have 
ideas of its own economic development? Japan’s 
ODA might have followed the World Bank’s 
direction based on a neoclasssical economy 
opposite to Japan’s preference of a state-led 
economy. Since Japan received loans from the 
World Bank to reconstruct its economy while it 
started ODA, the World Bank could influence 
Japan’s ODA policy. If this were the case, the 
institutionalist approach would claim that the 
international institutions like the World Bank 
and the United Nations can spill over the idea of 
economic development to individual countries. 
The approach also argues that international 
norms and ideas can shape a state’s policy 
preference.  
　　　Japan could have adopted a welfare 
state policy that gave more grant aid to the 
poorest countries if Japan had not had the 
idea of an economic development policy. 
Instead, Japan provided Asian countries 
most of their ODA as loans.  This policy was 
chosen because the Japanese government and 
business organizations shared the idea that 
mutual interests between donor and recipient 
countries are important. Providing ODA to 
Asian countries assisted Japanese business 
to expand investment and trade, as shown in 
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the Indonesian case study. Also, yen loans are 
designed to promote the self-help effort system 
in developing countries.
　　　If an external factor like the United 
States were more important than ideas in 
shaping Japan’s preference, Japan’s ODA loans 
could not have focused on Asia, since the United 
States suggested Japan change its geographical 
distributions.  If Japan had not provided ODA 
loans to Asian countries, economic development 
in Asia might have been delayed, and it might 
also not have been easy to create the Asian 
Pacific Economic Corporation (APEC).  
　　　However, will Japan continue to use 
those ideas? Some of the ideas probably will be 
enforced and continued, while others may not. 
The idea of support for self-help efforts is clearly 
emphasized in Japan’s basic philosophy in its 
ODA Charter of 1992. Also, the importance of 
self-help effort was recognized in the global aid 
community (Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), 1996: 1).  The idea of seeking mutual 
interests between Japan and recipient countries 
was also enforced and recognized by the DAC 
(DAC, 1996: 6).  Moreover, advocating national 
interests achieved through ODA helped Japan’s 
government justify the large volume of ODA 
under the sluggish domestic economy. Efficient 
public-private cooperation through ODA will be 
inevitable since Japan’s government needs more 
assistance from Japanese business for burden 
sharing due to its economic condition.  
　　　On the other hand, the idea of a state-
led economy has tended to disappear, since 
support of authoritarian states has become 
more difficult in the international community. 
Political freedom and human rights are more 
important, and one of the four principles of the 
ODA Charter states “full attention should be 
paid to efforts to promote democratization and 
introduction of a market-oriented economy, and 
the situation regarding the securing of basic 
human rights and freedom in the recipient 
country”(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998:151). 
Although Japan did not practice this principle 
by continuing aid to China and Myanmar, 
Japan should recognize the responsibility of its 
leadership role in the global aid community, and 
enhance its ODA principle in the future. 
　　　The aim to establish an Asian economic 
bloc was achieved when APEC was created, 
though its economic integrat ion is st i l l 
weak. Maintaining a large volume of ODA 
to developed Asian countries was no longer 
justifiable. Yet Japan’s ODA should continue 
helping other Asian countries in economic crisis 
and promoting economic stability in the regional 
bloc. Thus, the idea to establish an Asian 
economic bloc has transformed into the idea of 
promoting and maintaining the Asian economic 
bloc.  In conclusion, since the ideas of Japan’s 
economic development policy did not change 
through drastic changes in the domestic and 
international system at the end of World War 
II, as we have seen in this study, Japan’s ODA 
policy will continue to carry most of the ideas 
that have already been institutionalized in its 
ODA policy.  
NOTES
 1 Except Akira Nishigaki and Yasutanmi Shimomura, 
The Economics of Development Assistance (Tokyo: 
LTCB International Library Foundation, 1999), 
153-5 and Akitoshi Miyashita, “Gaiatsu and Japan’
s Foreign Aid: Rethinking the Reactive-Proactive 
Debate,” International Studies Quarterly ( 1999) 
43, 696. Nishigaki and Shimomura traced the ideas 
of Japan’s ODA to the Edo period. Miyashita 
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states that Japan’s postwar foreign aid was 
designed to reestablish wartime “Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.”
 2 Yukiko Kuramoto, “Japan’s Foreign Policy for Asia: 
Ideas of Economic Development and Institutions” 
(George Washington University, 2003: 17). The 
data was based on Toshiyuki Mizoguchi and 
Mataji Umemura eds., Basic Statistics of the 
Former Japanese Colonies 1995-1938. 
 3 This study borrows Haas’ definition of knowledge 
to define the ideas as independent variables.
 4 Except Kanji Ishiwara, who was in the Kwantung 
Army. Ishiwara had knowledge of economics, 
and he also initiated an outline plan to develop 
Manchuria. 
 5 An interview with a Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) officer (November 11, 1996).
 6 This study applied the method from Alexander 
George, “ Case Studies and Theory Development: 
The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” 
Paul Lauren, Diplomacy (New York: The Free 
Press, 1979), 43-68.
 7 Between 1965 and 1990, Japan’s ODA to Indonesia 
was nearly 74. 36 billion US dollars
 8 For instance, in 1968, even when Japan was not 
wealthy enough to increase its foreign aid further, 
the Foreign Minister Takeo Miki (later prime 
minister) explained the importance of Japan’s 
obligation of economic assistance. Diet, the Upper 
House, the Committee on Closing Accounts, the 
58th Diet, no. 13 (April 19, 1968).
 9 In comments by an officer of the Economic 
Planning Agency.  Diet, the Upper House, the 
Committee on Commerce and Industry, the 58th 
Diet no.22 (May 24, 1968).  
10 Current IGGI members are Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, 
United States, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), and Asian Development 
Bank(ADB).
11 Comment by The Foreign Minister Takeo Miki 
(later prime minister). Diet, the Lower House, the 
Committee on Closing Accounts, the 58th Diet 
no.10 (April 22, 1968).  
12 For example, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato explained 
the purpose of Japan’s economic assistance as an 
important foreign policy. Diet, the Upper House, 
the Committee on Commerce and Industry, the 
58th Diet no.22 (May 24, 1968). 
13 This  point was explained by the Foreign Minister 
Kiichi Aichi to introduce the view of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Diet, the Lower House, the 
Committee on Budget, the 61st Diet no.17 (March 
3, 1969). 
14 Agreement of the establishment of the ADB. Diet, 
the Upper House, the Finance Committee, the 68th 
Diet no.33 (June, 12 1972). 
15 The Finance Ministry officially explained the role 
of Japan in the ADB for the Finance Committee. 
Diet, the Upper House, the Finance Committee, 
the 68th Diet no.33 (June, 12 1972). 
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